Abstract
Purpose. The purpose of this study was to identify what triggered the creation of new risk bureaucracies and to determine the extent to which the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) have risk bureaucracy designs. Theoretical framework. A theoretical framework was developed to demonstrate the policy adoption and implementation phases of creating two new federal agencies that operate as risk bureaucracies. The policy adoption phase is explained by Cohen, March, and Olsen's garbage can theory, Kingdon's focusing events theory, and Baumgartner and Jones' punctuated equilibrium theory. The implementation phase is guided by Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin's use of cybernetic control theory. Methodology. The research design was a comparative case study of the creation of TSA and CFPB. Relevance sampling of secondary data was used to perform a content analysis. Congressional Records and agency websites were used to evaluate the policy adoption and implementation phases of creating each agency. Secondary data for this study were collected and analyzed to (a) explore the activities before, during, and after the creation of each agency and (b) evaluate each agency's design as a risk bureaucracy. The following cybernetic control functions, also known as risk bureaucracy components, were used for the assessment: standard setting (director), information gathering (detector), and behavior modification (effector). Findings. Problems impacting aviation security and consumer financial markets existed well before 9/11 and the 2008 financial crash. Risk was a contributing factor when each agency was established; however, it was a greater factor when creating TSA. There was an increase in discussions about aviation security when Congress passed legislation to create TSA. Similarly, there was an upward trend in discussions about consumers when Congress passed legislation to create CFPB. Risk bureaucracy components identified during policy adoption shifted during implementation. For TSA, risk bureaucracy components increased, giving the agency a greater capacity to control the aviation security system. For CFPB, the functions decreased leaving the agency with a diminished capacity to control the consumer financial system. Conclusions and recommendations. Risk bureaucracies must assess their activities and maintain a balanced approach to controlling their respective systems in order to maximize their capacity to prevent the types of catastrophic collapses that triggered their creation. Existing agencies that deal with risk should view their work within the context of a risk bureaucracy and assess the agency's mission and activities based upon cybernetic control.