Abstract
Purpose. This dissertation investigates government decisions. Specifically, this study estimated the effect of congressional defense committees' authorization and appropriation on civilian engineering employment. After the appropriation and authorization procedures are historically and empirically analyzed, a theoretical framework and relational models for regression analysis were developed and tested. Theoretical framework. The factors that reveal the congressional defense committees' motives were matched and tested with defense contracting to find out if they can disproportionately get defense benefits for the constituents in their states. Because the civilian engineering and manufacturing industries are highly involved with defense contracts, the relationship between them is tested to see the path of impact from Congress to the civilian economy. Methodology. The theoretical framework, and relational and regression models are drawn to show the relationship between important elements of congressional defense committees' decisions and the interests of private defense contractors and military personnel. This dissertation goes further by estimating the effect of their decisions' outcome in the forms of different levels of state defense contracts and payrolls on civilian engineers and manufacturing jobs since the fluctuations of defense spending should be critical for the employment level of civilian engineers and the growth of manufacturing jobs. Findings. Analysis of the data indicated that states with more representatives in Congress and/or representation in defense committees are likely to get more of the federal defense budget than states with fewer representatives in Congress and/or no representation in defense committees. In addition, states with a higher federal defense budget are likely to have more employed civilian engineers with higher annual median wage, as well as more manufacturing jobs, than states with lower federal defense budget. Conclusions, implications, and recommendations. The results support the theory that pork barreling determines the way Congress manages the defense budget because defense spending is used as a tool by congressional members, especially defense committee members, to stimulate their state economy, keep the unemployment rate in the technical and manufacturing areas low, and gain electoral benefits.